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F-SQUARED SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS AFTER 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 24, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its much-
anticipated decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
1
  After 
concluding that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does 
not apply extraterritorially, the Court announced a new standard for 
determining whether a particular securities transaction is subject to the 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
2
  Under this new 
transactional test, Section 10(b) applies only to purchases and sales of 
securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges and domestic transactions in other 
securities.
3
 
Although meant to be a bright-line rule, the transactional test has 
generated considerable controversy on account of its ambiguity.  Plaintiffs 
have seized on this uncertainty to argue that securities fraud claims brought 
by U.S. investors against foreign issuers remained viable post-Morrison 
even when the relevant securities were purchased on foreign exchanges (“f-
squared claims”).
4
  To date, courts confronted with this argument have 
engaged in unnecessarily protracted analyses of the Supreme Court’s 
rationale and policy objectives in announcing the test rather than focusing 
on the text of the transactional test itself. 
This Article concludes that the transactional test’s basis in the text of 
the Exchange Act provides the simplest, most direct means for disposing of 
f-squared claims.  Part I provides a brief overview of the state of the law 
 
         *  Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Terry College of Business, University of 
Georgia. 
 1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. (Morrison III), 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 2883–84. 
 3. Id. at 2884. 
 4. See infra text accompanying note 122. 
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prior to Morrison.  Part II traces Morrison’s rise through the district and 
circuit courts up to the United States Supreme Court.  Part III documents f-
squared plaintiffs’ attempts to circumvent Morrison and analyzes lower 
courts’ applications of the transactional test.  Part IV proposes a text-based 
rationale for dismissing f-squared claims that avoids the attenuated, policy-
based analyses employed by lower courts to date.  Finally, Part V examines 
the proposed standard’s applicability beyond the f-squared context. 
I.   THE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS TESTS 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, the Second Circuit 
employed two distinct tests to determine the extraterritorial reach of 
Section 10(b).  Satisfaction of either test was sufficient to confer subject 
matter jurisdiction, and courts sometimes merged the tests to obtain 
jurisdiction over cases that could not satisfy either test independently.
5
 
The first analysis was known as the “effects test” and was announced 
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.
6
  Under the effects test, subject matter 
jurisdiction was deemed to exist if “the wrongful conduct [abroad] had a 
substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.”
7
 
The second inquiry was known as the “conduct test” and was 
announced in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.
8
  
Under the conduct test, subject matter jurisdiction was deemed to exist if 
investors located abroad were harmed by conduct emanating from the 
United States.
9
  Significantly, the quantity and quality of wrongful conduct 
necessary to confer jurisdiction varied depending on whether the injured 
investors were Americans:  “When the alleged damages consisted of losses 
to American investors abroad, it was enough that acts ‘of material 
importance’ performed in the United States ‘significantly contributed’ to 
that result; whereas those acts must have ‘directly caused’ the result when 
losses to foreigners abroad were at issue.”
10
 
In recognition of the Second Circuit’s preeminence vis-à-vis 
application of the federal securities laws, variations of the conduct and 
effects tests were adopted by the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and 
D.C. Circuits.
11
  Although application of the effects test was relatively 
 
 5. Dennis R. Dumas, United States Antifraud Jurisdiction over Transnational 
Securities Transactions: Merger of the Conduct and Effects Tests, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 
721, 730–32 (1995). 
 6. 405 F.2d 200, 206–09 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 7. S.E.C. v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 8. 468 F.2d 1326, 1336–37 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 9. Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93. 
 10. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 
974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 11. Danielle Kantor, Note, The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-Cubed Case: 
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uniform across circuits, the degree of activity required to satisfy the 
conduct test varied widely.
12
  For example, the D.C. Circuit required that 
the conduct at issue constitute a prima facie violation of Section 10(b).
13
  In 
contrast, the Third Circuit required only that there be some domestic 
conduct in furtherance of the fraud.
14
  The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits have taken approaches that fall somewhere between these two 
extremes.
15
 
Over the course of their forty-year reign, the conduct and effects tests 
were subjected to extensive criticism.  The chief complaint was that the 
tests were unpredictable and inconsistently applied at both the intra-circuit 
and inter-circuit levels.
16
  One commentator went so far as to suggest that 
courts applying the tests “often seem[ed] to work backwards, first assuming 
jurisdiction over a particular case and then shaping an analysis to support 
the assertion of jurisdiction.”
17
  Consequently, a number of scholars 
proposed that the conduct and effects tests be revised or eliminated 
altogether in favor of a bright-line rule specifying the extraterritorial reach 
of U.S. securities laws.
18
  After decades of inaction by Congress and the 
United States Supreme Court, the fate of the conduct and effects tests was 
 
Adjudicating Transnational Securities Disputes in Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 839, 866–68 (2010). 
 12. Gregory K. Matson, Note, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over 
Transnational Securities Fraud, 79 GEO. L.J. 141, 152–53, 158–61 (1990) (discussing circuit 
courts’ differing applications of the conduct test); David Michaels, Note, Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction over Transnational Securities Fraud: A Suggested Roadmap to the New 
Standard of Reasonableness, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 919, 926 (1986) (noting that the Second 
Circuit, in applying the conduct test, sought to balance the quantity and quality of domestic 
and foreign conduct, whereas other circuits “rel[ied] instead on the distinction between 
significant and preparatory acts”). 
 13. James J. Finnerty, III, Note, The “Mother Court” and the Foreign Plaintiff: Does 
Rule 10b-5 Reach Far Enough?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S287, S305 (1993). 
 14. Michael Wallace Gordon, United States Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
in Securities Fraud Litigation, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 487, 521 (1996). 
 15. Kantor, supra note 11, at 867–68. 
 16. E.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities 
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 17 (2007); 
Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities 
Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2009); Paige Keenan Willison, 
Note, Europe and Overseas Commodity Traders v. Banque Paribas London: Zero Steps 
Forward and Two Steps Back, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 469, 472 (2000). 
 17. Matson, supra note 12, at 149. 
 18. E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of 
American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 228–29 (1996); Erez Reuveni, 
Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the 
Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1071–72 (2010); Margaret V. Sachs, The 
International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 682 (1990). 
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finally decided on June 24, 2010 when the Supreme Court handed down its 
opinion in Morrison. 
II.   MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. 
A.   The Facts 
National Australia Bank Ltd. (“National” or the “Bank”), a corporate 
entity organized under the laws of Australia and headquartered in 
Melbourne,
19
 was Australia’s largest bank.
20
  Its ordinary shares—the 
equivalent of common stock in the United States—traded on the Australian 
Securities Exchange and other foreign securities exchanges but not on any 
U.S. exchange.
21
  National’s American Depositary Receipts,
22
 however, 
were listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
23
 
In 1998, National acquired HomeSide Lending Incorporated 
(“HomeSide”),
24
 a Florida-based mortgage servicing company.
25
  Financial 
institutions paid HomeSide a fee to collect and process their customers’ 
mortgage payments.
26
  The servicing rights associated with these mortgages 
represented a future income stream to HomeSide, the present value of 
which depended, in part, on the likelihood that the underlying loans would 
be prepaid.
27
  Consequently, to calculate the present value of HomeSide’s 
mortgage-servicing rights, company executives had to make certain 
assumptions regarding the likelihood of prepayment.
28
  This value was 
 
 19. In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig. (Morrison I), No. 03 Civ. 6537 (BSJ), 2006 WL 
3844465, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. An American Depositary Receipt (“ADR”) is a: 
. . . receipt that is issued by a depositary bank that represents a specified amount 
of a foreign security that has been deposited with a foreign branch or agent of 
the depositary, known as the custodian.  The holder of an ADR is not the title 
owner of the underlying shares; the title owner of those shares is either the 
depositary, the custodian, or their agent.  ADRs are tradable in the same manner 
as any other registered American security, may be listed on any of the major 
exchanges in the United States or traded over the counter, and are subject to the 
[federal securities laws].  This makes trading an ADR simpler and more secure 
for American investors than trading in the underlying security in the foreign 
market. 
Id. at *1 n.3 (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 23. Id. at *1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *1. 
 26. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2875. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 2875–76. 
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ultimately incorporated into National’s public financial statements.
29
 
Initially, the acquisition appeared to be a boon for National.  Between 
1998 and 2001, the Bank consistently reported record profits.
30
  National 
and three of the four individual defendants publicly attributed this success 
to strong performance by HomeSide.
31
 
On July 5, 2001, however, National announced that it would record a 
$450 million write-down to reflect the decreased value of HomeSide’s 
mortgage-servicing rights.
32
  In response, the price of National’s ordinary 
shares and ADRs fell by more than 5%.
33
  Then, on September 3, 2001, 
National announced a second write-down of $1.75 billion.
34
  Of that 
amount, $400 million represented the devaluation of HomeSide’s 
mortgage-servicing rights.
35
  Another $760 million was attributed to 
mistaken assumptions in HomeSide’s valuation model.  The remaining 
$590 million represented loss of goodwill.
36
  As a result of the September 
write-down, the price of National’s ordinary shares fell by almost 13% 
while the price of its ADRs fell by more than 11%.
37
 
On January 30, 2004, four individuals filed a consolidated class action 
complaint against National, HomeSide, and certain individual defendants
38
 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
39
  
The complaint alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the 
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.
40
  Plaintiffs claimed that HomeSide 
“knowingly used unreasonably optimistic . . . assumptions or 
methodologies” in valuing its mortgage-servicing rights and that the 
defendants made materially false and misleading statements regarding 
HomeSide’s “profitability, economic health, and its contribution to 
[National].”
41
 
Three of the four plaintiffs—Russell Owen and Brian and Geraldine 
 
 29. Id. at 2875. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 2875–76. 
 33. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2. 
 34. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2. 
 38. The individual defendants included:  (1) Frank Cicutto, National’s managing 
director and chief executive officer; (2) Hugh Harris, HomeSide’s chief executive officer; 
(3) Kevin Race, HomeSide’s chief operating officer; and (4) W. Blake Wilson, HomeSide’s 
chief financial officer.  Id. at *1. 
 39. Consolidated Class Action Complaint, Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 25, 2006) (No. 03-06537). 
 40. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *1. 
 41. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd. (Morrison II), 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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Silverlock (the “Australian Plaintiffs”)
42
—were Australian residents who 
purchased National’s ordinary shares on the Australian Securities 
Exchange.
43
  The Australian Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of foreign 
purchasers of National’s ordinary shares.
44
  The fourth plaintiff, Robert 
Morrison (the “Domestic Plaintiff”),
45
 was a United States resident who 
purchased National’s ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange.
46
  Morrison 
sought to represent a class of American purchasers of National’s ADRs.
47
 
B.  The District Court Opinion 
On March 11, 2004, the defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the 
Australian Plaintiffs and for failure to state a claim with respect to the 
Domestic Plaintiff.
48
  On October 25, 2006, Judge Barbara Jones granted 
both motions.
49
 
In ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, Judge Jones’ analysis focused on whether HomeSide’s 
Florida-based activities were sufficient to satisfy the conduct test.  The 
Australian Plaintiffs argued that but-for HomeSide’s accounting 
manipulation in Florida, National’s public statements would not have been 
fraudulent, whereas the defendants asserted that “the alleged securities 
fraud was committed—if at all—only when [National] distributed the 
allegedly false information . . . abroad.”
50
 
Although a “close call,” the court found that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the Australian Plaintiffs’ claims.
51
  Specifically, Judge 
Jones held that the conduct test was not satisfied because HomeSide’s 
activities in the United States were “at most, a link in the chain of an 
alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad.”
52
 
Before concluding, the court addressed the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim vis-à-vis the Domestic Plaintiff.  After 
noting that economic loss is an essential element of a cognizable securities 
 
 42. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
 43. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2. 
 44. Morrison II, 547 F.3d at 169. 
 45. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Morrison II, 547 F.3d at 169. 
 48. Morrison I, 2006 WL 3844465, at *2, *8. 
 49. Judge Jones noted that the defendants did not include the Domestic Plaintiff’s 
claims in their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since “[t]here is no 
dispute that the securities law extends to protect domestic investors who purchase securities 
in domestic markets.”  Id. at *2 n.6. 
 50. Id. at *5. 
 51. Id. at *8. 
 52. Id. 
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fraud claim, Judge Jones held that dismissal was warranted because the 
Domestic Plaintiff had failed to allege any damages.
53
 
C.   The Circuit Court Opinion 
On February 13, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal 
challenging the district court’s dismissal of the Australian Plaintiffs’ claims 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
54
  Significantly, the Domestic 
Plaintiff’s claims were not appealed.
55
  On October 23, 2008, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.
56
 
At the outset of its opinion, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it 
was being called upon “to revisit the vexing question of the extraterritorial 
application of the securities laws.”
57
  After summarizing the relevant tests, 
the court noted that the appellants were not relying on the effects test to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction.
58
  Consequently, the court limited its 
analysis to the conduct test, which required that the Second Circuit 
“identify which action or actions constituted the fraud and directly caused 
harm . . . and then determine if that act or those actions emanated from the 
United States.”
59
 
The Second Circuit ultimately found that subject matter jurisdiction 
was lacking.  The court held that “[t]he actions taken and the actions not 
taken by [National] in Australia were . . . significantly more central to the 
fraud and more directly responsible for the harm to investors than the 
manipulation of the numbers in Florida.”
60
  The court concluded its opinion 
by acknowledging:  “When a statement or public filing [made by National] 
fails to meet [applicable accounting, legal, and regulatory] standards, the 
responsibility, as a practical matter, lies in Australia, not Florida.”
61
  
Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the appellants’ 
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
In light of the uncertainty associated with the conduct test, the 
appellees invited the Second Circuit to adopt a bright-line rule regarding 
 
 53. Id. at *9. 
 54. Morrison II, 547 F.3d at 169–70. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 177. 
 57. Id. at 168.  After noting that the Exchange Act is silent with respect to its 
extraterritorial application, the Second Circuit “urge[d] that this significant omission receive 
the appropriate attention of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission.”  Id. at 
170 n.4. 
 58. Id. at 176. 
 59. Id. at 173. 
 60. Id. at 176. 
 61. Id. 
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the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b).
62
  The appellees argued that no 
amount of domestic conduct should be sufficient to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction if there was not some corresponding effect in the United 
States.
63
  Because foreign-cubed cases, by definition, involve foreign 
investors suing foreign issuers in connection with securities transactions 
occurring on foreign exchanges, the relevant conduct in these cases does 
not have any U.S.-related effects.
64
  Consequently, under the appellees’ 
proposed rule, foreign-cubed cases would be without the subject matter 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts. 
The appellees asserted that such a rule would be consistent with the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, a canon of statutory construction 
providing that unless a contrary intent appears, U.S. laws are “meant to 
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”
65
  Failure 
to adopt the appellees’ proposed rule would allegedly “undermine the 
competitive and effective operation of American securities markets, 
discourage cross-border economic activity, . . . cause duplicative 
litigation[,]” and ensure international conflicts of law.
66
 
The Second Circuit declined the appellees’ invitation, stating:  “[W]e 
are leery of rigid bright-line rules . . . .”
67
  With respect to the appellees’ 
conflicts of law concerns, the court declared: 
The problem of conflict between our laws and those of a foreign 
government is much less of a concern when the issue is the 
enforcement of the anti-fraud sections of the securities laws than 
with such provisions as those requiring registration of persons or 
securities.  The reason is that while registration requirements may 
widely vary, anti-fraud enforcement objectives are broadly 
similar as governments and other regulators are generally in 
agreement that fraud should be discouraged.
68
 
The potential for conflict between Section 10(b) and the anti-fraud laws of 
foreign nations, thus, did not warrant abandoning the conduct and effects 
tests.
69
 
Moreover, the Second Circuit was concerned that the appellees’ 
proposed rule would turn the United States into a “safe haven for securities 
cheaters” who would then export securities fraud to the rest of the world.
70
  
 
 62. Id. at 174. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting 
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
 66. Morrison II, 547 F.3d at 174. 
 67. Id. at 175. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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The court conceded, however, that “we are an American court, not the 
world’s court, and we cannot and should not expend our resources 
resolving cases that do not affect Americans or involve fraud emanating 
from America.”
71
  The conduct and effects tests were held to adequately 
balance these competing concerns such that the court declined to adopt the 
appellees’ proposed rule.
72
 
D.   The Supreme Court Opinion 
The question before the Supreme Court was “whether § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign 
plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in 
connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.”
73
 
The Court first addressed whether Section 10(b) applied 
extraterritorially.  Justice Scalia noted that prior to 1968 the district courts 
in the Southern District of New York had consistently applied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to hold that Section 10(b) did not 
reach fraud claims predicated on foreign stock transactions.
74
  Between 
1968 and 1972, however, the Second Circuit “excised the presumption 
against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of § 10(b) . . . .”
75
  
Whereas the presumption against extraterritoriality provides that statutes 
should not be given extraterritorial effect absent a clear mandate from 
Congress, the Second Circuit had interpreted Congress’ silence regarding 
the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) as an implied grant of authority to 
discern whether Congress would have wanted Section 10(b) to apply to a 
given fact pattern.
76
  To facilitate this analysis, the Second Circuit 
developed the conduct and effects tests, which “became the north star of 
the Second Circuit’s § 10(b) jurisprudence, pointing the way to what 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that the 
Southern District of New York erred in dismissing the petitioners’ claims for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Id. at 
2877.  Instead, the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) was found to constitute a 
merits question properly reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6).  Id.  Nevertheless, the petitioners’ 
request that the case be remanded to the Southern District of New York was denied on the 
grounds that “a remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 
12(b)(1) conclusion.”  Id.  Consequently, the remainder of the Court’s opinion addressed 
whether the petitioners’ allegations stated a claim under the federal securities laws. 
 74. Id. at 2878. 
 75. Id. at 2878–79. 
 76. Id. at 2879.  This analysis effectively turned the presumption against 
extraterritoriality on its head, requiring that Congress expressly disavow any extraterritorial 
application before the court would limit a statute’s reach to domestic matters. 
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Congress would have wished.”
77
 
The Supreme Court criticized the conduct and effects tests on a 
number of grounds.  First, the Second Circuit failed to identify “a textual or 
even extratextual [sic] basis for [the] tests.”
78
  Instead, as early as 1975 the 
Second Circuit conceded that, “‘if we were asked to point to language in 
the statutes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these [tests], 
we would be unable to respond.’”
79
 
Second, the tests were difficult to administer.
80
  The conduct test 
varied depending on whether the harmed investors were Americans or 
foreigners, and satisfying the conduct test was not necessarily sufficient to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction since courts occasionally required that 
there be “‘some additional factor tipping the scales’ in favor of the 
application of American law.”
81
  Justice Scalia declared, “[t]here is no more 
damning indictment of the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests than the Second 
Circuit’s own declaration that ‘the presence or absence of any single factor 
which was considered significant in other cases . . . is not necessarily 
dispositive in future cases.’”
82
 
Third, variations of the conduct and effects tests had been adopted by 
the other circuits, resulting in an incoherent patchwork of tests for 
determining the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).
83
 
Citing these failings, the Supreme Court rejected the conduct and 
effects tests in favor of a textual analysis of Section 10(b) as informed by 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.
84
  After noting that “[o]n its face, 
§ 10(b) contains nothing to suggest it applies abroad,” Justice Scalia 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (quoting Interbrew v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998)). 
 82. Id. (quoting I.I.T. v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 83. Id. at 2880.  After quoting Justice Rehnquist’s oft-cited declaration that “[w]hen we 
deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown 
from little more than a legislative acorn,” Justice Scalia noted that: 
. . . [t]he concurrence seemingly believes that the Courts of Appeals have 
carefully trimmed and sculpted this “judicial oak” into a cohesive canopy, under 
the watchful eye of Judge Henry Friendly, the “master arborist.”  Even if one 
thinks that the “conduct” and “effects” tests are numbered among Judge 
Friendly’s many fine contributions to the law, his successors, though perhaps 
under the impression that they nurture the same mighty oak, are in reality 
tending each its own botanically distinct tree. 
Id. at 2880 n.4 (internal citations omitted). 
 84. See id. at 2881 (“The criticisms seem to us justified.  The results of judicial-
speculation-made-law—divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the 
situation before the court—demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.”). 
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proceeded to consider and reject three text-based arguments for the 
extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).
85
  First, the petitioners cited the 
Exchange Act’s definition of “interstate commerce,” a term used in Section 
10(b), as evidence Congress intended to give the statute extraterritorial 
effect.
86
  The Exchange Act defines “interstate commerce” to include 
“trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any 
foreign country and any State.”
87
  The Court dismissed this argument, 
stating, “[W]e have repeatedly held that even statutes that contain broad 
language in their definitions of ‘commerce’ that expressly refer to ‘foreign 
commerce’ do not apply abroad.”
88
  Consequently, a single reference to 
foreign commerce within a statutory definition was deemed insufficient to 
rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.
89
 
Next, the petitioners pointed to Congress’ purpose in enacting the 
Exchange Act as evidence that Section 10(b) was meant to apply abroad.
90
  
The prologue to the Exchange Act provides that “prices established and 
offered in such transactions are generally disseminated and quoted 
throughout the United States and foreign countries.”
91
  In rejecting this 
argument, the Supreme Court observed that the antecedent of “such 
transactions” was located “in the first sentence of the section, which 
declares that ‘transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon 
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a 
national public interest.’”
92
  The Court concluded, “[n]othing suggests that 
this national public interest pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign 
exchanges and markets.”
93
 
The petitioners’ third and final text-based argument relied on Section 
30(b) of the Exchange Act, which concerns persons “transact[ing] a 
business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States.”
94
  As 
paraphrased by the Court, Section 30(b) provides: 
“The provisions of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he 
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the 
United States,” unless he does so in violation of regulations 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 2882 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(17) (2010)). 
 88. Id. (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 251) (emphasis in original). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (2010)). 
 92. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010)). 
 93. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2010). 
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prevent . . . evasion of [the Act].
95
 
The respondents argued that Section 30(b) “create[d] only a narrow, 
potential, SEC-gatekept extraterritorial application” of the Exchange Act 
that was insufficient by itself to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.
96
  In contrast, the United States Solicitor General argued 
that Section 30(b) confirmed the Exchange Act’s extraterritorial effect 
because the “exemption” embodied in Section 30(b) “would have no 
function if the Act did not apply in the first instance to securities 
transactions that occur abroad.”
97
  Although Justice Scalia found the 
Solicitor General’s proposed interpretation “possible,” he held that 
“possible interpretations of statutory language do not override the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.”
98
 
The petitioners’ reliance on Section 30(b) was further undercut by the 
text of Section 30(a).
99
  In relevant part, Section 30(a) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . to make use of 
the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce for the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within 
or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction 
in any security the issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized 
under the laws of, or has its principal place of business in, a place 
within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and 
Exchange] Commission may prescribe . . . .
100
 
The Court found that Section “30(a) contains what § 10(b) lacks:  a clear 
statement of extraterritorial effect.”
101
  Justice Scalia reasoned that this 
“explicit provision for a specific extraterritorial application would be quite 
superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to transactions 
on foreign exchanges—and its limitation of that application to securities of 
domestic issuers would be inoperative.”
102
  Consequently, the “clear 
statement” found in Section 30(a) confirmed that Congress knew how to 
give certain provisions of the Exchange Act extraterritorial effect such that 
the absence of similar language from Section 10(b) reflected a deliberate 
decision by Congress to limit its application to domestic securities 
 
 95. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2010)). 
 96. Brief for Respondents at 54–55, Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-
1191). 
 97. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14, 
Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191). 
 98. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2883 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 253). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2010)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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transactions.
103
 
After concluding that Section 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially, 
the Court addressed the petitioners’ argument that they were seeking only a 
domestic application of the Exchange Act.
104
  Emphasizing the extent of 
HomeSide’s Florida-based activities, the petitioners asserted that the 
respondents’ conduct was sufficiently domestic to state a claim under 
Section 10(b).
105
  Justice Scalia dismissed the petitioners’ argument, 
reasoning that “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where 
the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the 
United States.”
106
  He went on to note that “Section 10(b) does not punish 
deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange 
or any security not so registered.’”
107
  Thus, even assuming that the conduct 
constituting the alleged fraud occurred entirely within the United States, the 
consolidated complaint failed to state a claim because the petitioners—all 
of whom were Australian—purchased their shares on the Australian 
Securities Exchange.
108
 
The Court then announced a new “transactional test” for determining 
the reach of Section 10(b).
109
  The opinion contains three articulations of 
the test, each slightly different in its phrasing and terminology: 
1. “And it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on 
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other 
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”
110
 
2. “[W]hether the purchase or sale is made in the United States, 
or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange . . . .”
111
 
3. “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, 
and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United 
States.”
112
 
The Court asserted that its new test would avoid the international conflicts 
of law concerns raised by Australia, the United Kingdom, and France.
113
 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 2883–86. 
 105. Id. at 2883–84. 
 106. Id. at 2884. 
 107. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010)). 
 108. Id. at 2884–88. 
 109. Id. at 2886. 
 110. Id. at 2884. 
 111. Id. at 2886. 
 112. Id. at 2888. 
 113. Id. at 2885–86. 
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Applying the transactional test to the facts of Morrison, the Court 
held, “[t]his case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and 
all aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners who still 
have live claims occurred outside the United States.”
114
  Consequently, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the consolidated complaint 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
115
 
III.   F-SQUARED CASES POST-MORRISON 
Although meant to be a bright-line rule, the transactional test has 
proven difficult to administer for two reasons.  First, the Supreme Court 
failed to provide a single, coherent articulation of the test.  Instead, the 
opinion contains three variations of the test, each containing subtle yet 
potentially significant differences.  Second, the various articulations are 
poorly drafted.
116
  The Court mistakes brevity for clarity, failing to define 
certain key terms or otherwise specify the precise contours of the test.  
Thus, rather than curing the uncertainty that plagued the conduct and 
effects tests, the transactional test has cast what was previously a semi-
stable area of the law into abject confusion. 
A.   F-Squared Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Circumvent Morrison 
Plaintiffs seeking to preserve f-squared claims argue that Morrison 
should be limited to its facts so that only f-cubed cases are outside the 
scope of Section 10(b).  They contend that Morrison’s holding turned on 
the fact that “all aspects of the purchases complained of . . . occurred 
outside the United States” such that “the Supreme Court did not address—
and did not foreclose—the claims of U.S. investors who purchased 
securities on a foreign exchange, where ‘aspects of the purchase’ occurred 
in the United States.”
117
 
 
 114. Id. at 2888. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: 
Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 8–14 (2011). 
 117. Supplemental Memorandum of Law Addressing Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd. and in Further Support of the Motion of the U.S. Members of the Institutional 
Investor Group for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff at 2–3, Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor 
Corp., 2010 WL 3377409 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-922) (quoting Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 
2888) (emphasis added); see also Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum Concerning the 
Impact of Morrison v. National Australia Bank at 5, In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. 
Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 02-5571) (“Unlike the facts of Morrison, 
this is not a situation where ‘all aspects of the purchases . . . occurred outside the United 
States.’”); Lead Plaintiffs Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management Board 
and Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System’s Supplemental Memorandum of 
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Plaintiffs ostensibly find support for their “some domestic aspects” 
argument in the text of the transactional test.  While conceding that 
securities listed exclusively on foreign exchanges cannot satisfy the 
“securities listed on domestic exchanges” prong of the test, f-squared 
plaintiffs contend that transactions in such securities may nevertheless 
qualify as “domestic transactions in other securities” so long as aspects of 
the transactions occur in the United States. 
By focusing on the purportedly domestic aspects of their purchases, f-
squared plaintiffs seek to replace the Court’s bright-line rule with a fact-
intensive inquiry reminiscent of the conduct and effects tests.  Consider, for 
example, the arguments put forth by the plaintiff—a U.S. institutional 
investor—in the Swiss Reinsurance Company securities fraud class action 
litigation.
118
  There, the plaintiff asserted that its purchases of Swiss Re 
stock on the Swiss stock exchange constituted “domestic transactions” 
within the meaning of the transactional test because the plaintiff “made the 
decision to invest in Swiss Re stock, and initiated the purchase of Swiss Re 
stock, from the United States.”
119
  In support of its contention, the Swiss Re 
plaintiff cited the following facts: 
As set forth in the accompanying affidavit of Tremaine Atkinson, 
the Chief Operating Officer at LSV Asset Management (“LSV”), 
the Chicago-based brokerage firm authorized to make trades on 
behalf of [the plaintiff] during the Class Period, the decision to 
purchase Swiss Re stock on behalf of [the plaintiff] was made by 
LSV portfolio managers located in Chicago.  Then, Chicago-
based traders at LSV electronically placed orders for Swiss Re 
stock on behalf of [the plaintiff].  Those purchase orders were 
then executed by LSV traders located in Chicago, who 
electronically routed the orders through electronic connections 
 
Law Addressing the Impact of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. at 6, In re Royal 
Bank of Scot. Group PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-300) 
[hereinafter RBS Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law] (“Unlike the situation in Morrison where 
the plaintiffs were ‘all Australians’ and ‘all aspects of the purchases took place outside the 
United States,’ here the purchases occurred within the United States . . . .”); Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Memorandum of Law in 
Further Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 4, 
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 
166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-1958) [hereinafter Swiss Reinsurance Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Law] (“Morrison clearly contemplated circumstances where §10(b) was 
implicated by the occurrence of only some ‘aspect’ of a securities transaction within the 
U.S.”) (emphasis in original); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Reconsideration of Dismissal of LAMPERS’ Claims or to Certify Dismissal at 3 n.2, 
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-3758) 
(“The analysis of ‘all aspects of the purchases’ does not make sense if only one ‘aspect,’ 
where the securities transaction was recorded, was controlling.”). 
 118. Swiss Reinsurance Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 117, at 2. 
 119. Id. at 7. 
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that LSV maintains with a number of brokers who are 
responsible for matching purchase orders for Swiss Re stock with 
shares of Swiss Re stock that are offered for sale.  In sum, Mr. 
Atkinson averred that:  (i) the decision to purchase Swiss Re 
Stock [sic] was made by LSV portfolio managers in Chicago; (ii) 
the orders for Swiss Re stock were placed from Chicago; and (iii) 
the LSV traders who executed the purchase orders for Swiss Re 
stock were located in Chicago.
120
 
The Swiss Re plaintiff, thus, argued that the domestic aspects of its 
purchases rendered them distinguishable from the wholly-foreign purchases 
at issue in Morrison.
121
  Plaintiffs in other f-squared cases have advanced 
similar arguments.
122
 
F-squared defendants have had no choice but to respond in kind and 
list every conceivable fact demonstrating the foreign nature of the 
underlying securities transactions.  Again, the Swiss Re case is illustrative.  
After noting that the judge had “repeatedly urged Plaintiff to submit an 
 
 120. Id. at 7–8 (internal citations omitted). 
 121. See id. at 1–5. 
 122. See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(arguing plaintiffs “made an investment decision and initiated a purchase of [Credit Suisse] 
stock from the U.S.” and “took the [Credit Suisse] stock into its own account in the U.S. and 
incurred an economic risk in the U.S.”); Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment 
Management Board’s Supplemental Memorandum Addressing Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank and in Further Support of its Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and 
Selection of Lead Counsel at 3–4, Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2010 WL 3377409 
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-00922) (contending that the location “where the investment 
decision is made” is dispositive of whether the transaction is foreign or domestic such that 
plaintiff’s decision “to purchase its Toyota stock occurred within the U.S., as virtually all of 
its money managers are U.S. based”); Plaintiffs’ Sur-Reply Addressing the Impact of 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave 
to Take Personal Jurisdiction Discovery at 5, In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., 2010 WL 
3910286 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-02495) (arguing that one plaintiff “did not leave the 
United States to purchase SocGen stock” but instead acquired the security “by means of 
domestic contractual transactions, through U.S. investment managers”); Lead Plaintiffs’ 
Letter-Brief Responding to Show Cause Order as to Why the Federal Securities Claims of 
Plaintiffs Who Purchased Alstom S.A. Securities that are Recorded on Exchanges Located 
Outside the U.S. Should Not be Dismissed in Light of Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd. at 3, In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 03-6595) 
(asserting that “[a]ll of the Lead Plaintiffs’ transactions were initiated in the U.S. and, as a 
result, amount to ‘the purchase or sale’ of a security ‘in the United States’”); Lead Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to UBS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims Based 
on Purchases of UBS Shares Outside the United States at 33–35, In re UBS AG Sec. Litig. 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 07-11225) (“Oregon’s purchase of UBS stock occurred in the 
U.S. . . . because Oregon made the decision to invest in UBS stock, and initiated the 
purchase of UBS stock, from the U.S. by means of domestic contractual transactions.”); 
RBS Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 117, at 7 (asserting plaintiffs were 
“prepared to demonstrate that their decisions to purchase many of their RBS ordinary shares 
were made in the United States, based on the direction of their United States-based asset 
managers”). 
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affidavit setting out the full details of its stock transactions,” the defendants 
suggested that the court had received only half of the picture.
123
  
Specifically, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff’s affidavit was “silent 
regarding what happened after LSV placed the orders—where the orders 
were sent or where the trades were executed, cleared and settled.”
124
  In an 
attempt to fill in the missing pieces, the defendants cited the following 
facts: 
 In 2007 . . . Swiss Re common stock was listed only on the 
SWX Swiss Exchange . . . and was traded only on virt-x[,] . . . a 
subsidiary of SWX Swiss Exchange based in London.  All 
market transactions in Swiss Re common stock during the 
purported class period were executed, cleared and settled on virt-
x’s trading platform in Europe. 
 Specifically, all clearing services for virt-x . . . were 
performed by either LCH.Clearnet Ltd or SIS x-clear Ltd.  
LCH.Clearnet Ltd maintains its registered office in London.  SIS 
x-clear Ltd. . . . is a Zurich based company and part of the SIS 
Swiss Financial Services Group AG. 
 All settlement services for virt-x trades were performed by 
Euroclear UK & Ireland Ltd, SIS SegaInterSettle AG or 
Euroclear Bank.  Euroclear UK & Ireland Ltd is incorporated in 
England and Wales and maintains a registered office in London.  
SIS SegaInterSettle AG is an Olten, Switzerland based company 
and part of the SIS Swiss Financial Services Group AG.  
Euroclear Bank is a limited liability company incorporated and 
domiciled in Belgium.
125
 
The defendants asserted that although the investment decisions and 
purchase orders may have originated in Chicago, the trades were actually 
executed, cleared, and settled in Europe such that they constituted foreign 
transactions outside the scope of Section 10(b).
126
 
The Swiss Re case, thus, illustrates precisely the sort of subjective, 
fact-intensive inquiry the Supreme Court sought to avoid in announcing its 
new transactional test.
127
  If lower courts were to hold that Section 10(b) 
 
 123. Supplemental Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 5, Plumbers’ Union Local No. 
12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-
01958). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 5–6 (internal citations omitted). 
 126. Id. at 5–9. 
 127. See Credit Suisse, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (rejecting plaintiffs’ “some domestic 
aspects” argument on the ground that “[t]he creation of such an exception to the Morrison 
transactional rule necessarily would invite extensive analysis required to parse foreign 
securities trades so as to assess quantitatively how many and which parts or events of the 
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applies whenever the underlying securities transaction has “some domestic 
aspects,” this sort of analysis would be required in virtually every f-squared 
case. 
B.   Lower Courts’ Application of the Transactional Test 
As of the date of publication, no court had been persuaded by the 
“some domestic aspects” interpretation of the transactional test.  In 
dismissing f-squared claims, however, district courts have ignored arguably 
the simplest and most direct means for disposing of these cases. 
Consider, for example, the case of Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group.
128
  
Approximately two weeks after the Supreme Court handed down its 
opinion in Morrison, the Credit Suisse defendants moved for judgment on 
the pleadings with respect to those plaintiffs who purchased Credit Suisse 
shares on the Swiss Stock Exchange.
129
  In granting the defendants’ motion, 
Judge Victor Marrero relied on the Morrison Court’s rationale and policy 
objectives rather than on the text of the transactional test.
130
 
Judge Marrero predicated his dismissal of the plaintiffs’ f-squared 
claims on three grounds.
131
  First, the “some domestic aspects” 
interpretation of the transactional test improperly sought to revive the 
conduct and effects tests.  Second, under the plaintiffs’ theory, U.S. courts 
“would be called upon to enforce American laws regulating transactions in 
securities that are also governed by the laws of the foreign country and 
exchanges where those securities were actually purchased or sold” in 
contravention of Morrison.
132
  Third, the Supreme Court had signaled that 
semi-domestic securities transactions would not satisfy the transactional 
test.
133
 
For Judge Marrero, the Morrison Court’s citation to Aramco
134
 
provided additional evidence “that the presumption against extraterritorial 
effect should not be diminished just because ‘some domestic activity is 
involved in the case.’”
135
  In Aramco, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
 
transactions occurred within United States territory, and then to apply value judgments to 
determine whether the cluster of those activities sufficed to cross over the threshold of 
enough domestic contacts to justify extraterritorial application of § 10(b)”); see also 
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 
166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that “[t]he plaintiffs’ construction would require a fact-
bound, case-by-case inquiry”). 
 128. 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 129. Id. at 621. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 624. 
 132. Id. at 625. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 244. 
 135. Credit Suisse, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 626 (quoting Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2884). 
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dismissal of a lawsuit brought by an American citizen against two of his 
former employers, both Delaware corporations, for discriminatory conduct 
that allegedly occurred while the plaintiff was working for the defendants 
in Saudi Arabia.
136
  After concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did 
not apply extraterritorially, the Supreme Court held that dismissal was 
warranted even though the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen and had been hired 
by the defendants in Houston, Texas.
137
  Consequently, Judge Marrero 
concluded that securities transactions may have some domestic aspects and 
still be outside the scope of Section 10(b).
138
 
Thus, rather than relying solely on the text of the transactional test to 
hold that the defendants were entitled to judgment on the pleadings vis-à-
vis those plaintiffs who purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock 
Exchange, Judge Marrero instead engaged in an unnecessarily protracted 
analysis of the Morrison Court’s rationale and policy objectives.
139
 
Several weeks later, Judge Marrero dismissed the claims of another f-
squared plaintiff in an unrelated case, relying solely on his opinion in 
Credit Suisse.
140
  Other judges have similarly relied on Credit Suisse to 
dismiss f-squared plaintiffs’ claims—often without articulating any 
independent rationale of their own.
141
 
Swiss Re is another example of an f-squared case in which the court 
failed to identify the most direct, text-based rationale for dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claims.  Judge Koeltl of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York phrased the issue as follows:  “Whether a 
 
 136. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 247. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Credit Suisse, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 626.  In a footnote, Judge Marrero asserted that 
Justice Stevens’ concurrence provided additional evidence that f-squared claims are outside 
the scope of Section 10(b) post-Morrison.  Specifically, Justice Stevens indicated that the 
transactional test would not be satisfied under the following fact pattern:  “[A]n American 
investor . . . buys shares in a company listed only on an overseas exchange” and “[t]hat 
company has a major American subsidiary with executives based in New York City; and it 
was in New York City that the executives masterminded and implemented a massive 
deception which artificially inflated the stock price . . . .” Id. at 627 (quoting Morrison III, 
130 S. Ct. at 2895). 
 139. Id. at 625–27; see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 
512, 532–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (relying on Aramco and Justice Stevens’ concurrence in 
Morrison to dismiss f-squared claims). 
 140. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In 
[Credit Suisse], this Court rejected Plaintiffs’ first contention [—that a U.S. investor’s 
purchase of foreign securities on a foreign exchange constitutes a domestic transaction 
under Morrison because the purchase was initiated in the United States—] as a general 
matter.”). 
 141. See In re Royal Bank of Scot. Group PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting the transactional test and citing Judge Marrero’s holding in Credit 
Suisse); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting the 
transactional test and citing Judge Marrero’s holding in Credit Suisse). 
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security that is not traded on a domestic stock exchange is ‘purchase[d] . . . 
in the United States’ for the purposes of section 10(b) any time an investor 
decides to purchase the security and places a purchase order with a broker 
while in the United States.”
142
  After noting that the Supreme Court “did 
not have occasion to discuss what it means for a purchase or sale to be 
‘made in the United States[,]’” Judge Koeltl acknowledged that the Court 
“did, however, make it clear that that question is guided by the text of the 
Exchange Act and by the need to adopt clear tests that avoid interference 
with foreign securities regulation.”
143
 
The Exchange Act defines the term “purchase” to include “any 
contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.”
144
  Citing Second Circuit 
precedent, the Swiss Re plaintiff argued that an individual becomes a 
purchaser within the meaning of the Exchange Act “when he or she 
incur[s] an irrevocable liability to take and pay for the stock,” i.e., at the 
moment the investor places a buy order.
145
  Because the relevant buy orders 
were placed by brokers located in Chicago, the plaintiff asserted that its 
purchases of Swiss Re common stock occurred in the U.S.
146
  Judge Koeltl 
noted that other courts considering f-squared claims had “unanimously 
rejected” this argument and reasoned that the term “purchase” must be 
construed so as to avoid the international conflicts of law concerns raised in 
Morrison.
147
  Consequently, the court held that “as a general matter, a 
purchase order in the United States for a security that is sold on a foreign 
exchange is insufficient to subject the purchase to the coverage of section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act.”
148
 
After finding that the trades were executed, cleared, and settled in 
Europe, Judge Koeltl proceeded to reject the plaintiff’s arguments that 
these were nevertheless domestic securities transactions within the scope of 
Section 10(b).  First, the court held that the plaintiff’s status as a U.S. 
resident was irrelevant:  “A purchaser’s citizenship or residency does not 
affect where a transaction occurs; a foreign resident can make a purchase 
within the United States, and a United States resident can make a purchase 
outside the United States.”
149
  Second, the fact that the investment decision 
was made in Chicago had “no bearing on where the stock was ultimately 
 
 142. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 166, 175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. at 176 (quotation marks omitted). 
 144. Id. at 177 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (2010)). 
 145. Id. (citing Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954)). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. (stating that the term “‘purchase’ cannot bear the expansive construction 
plaintiffs propose, at least for the purposes of Morrison’s transactional test”). 
 148. Id. at 178. 
 149. Id. 
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purchased.”
150
  Third, although the plaintiff may have suffered financial 
harm in the U.S., “the location of the harm . . . is independent of the 
location of the securities transaction that produced the harm.”
151
  Fourth, it 
was deemed immaterial that the purchase orders were placed and executed 
in Chicago.
152
  The plaintiff’s claims were therefore dismissed for failing to 
satisfy the transactional test.
153
 
IV.   A TEXT-BASED RATIONALE FOR DISMISSING F-SQUARED CLAIMS 
Although courts considering f-squared claims post-Morrison arguably 
have reached the correct result, the means by which they have arrived at 
their holdings has, to date, been unnecessarily protracted and circuitous.  
Rather than relying on the Supreme Court’s policy objectives in 
announcing its new test or attempting to divine the Court’s intentions from 
Justice Stevens’ concurrence, courts confronted with f-squared claims 
should look first to the text of the transactional test itself.  As noted 
previously, the Morrison Court provided three articulations of the test: 
1. “And it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on 
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other 
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.”
154
 
2. “[W]hether the purchase or sale is made in the United States, 
or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange . . . .”
155
 
3. “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the 
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”
156
 
Although worded slightly differently, each articulation of the test was 
meant to track the language of Section 10(b), which prohibits deceptive 
conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.”
157
  
Whereas the Second Circuit had been unable to identify a textual or even 
extra-textual basis for the conduct and effects tests, the Morrison Court was 
careful to note the transactional test’s textual origin:
158
 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 177. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
 155. Id. at 2886. 
 156. Id. at 2888. 
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010). 
 158. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Hath Morrison Wrought?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 2010, 
at 5 (“Morrison is a decision that rests at least as much on a close reading of the statutory 
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Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only 
deceptive conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered.”  Those purchase-and-sale transactions 
are the objects of the statute’s solicitude.  It is those transactions 
that the statute seeks to “regulate[;]” it is parties or prospective 
parties to those transactions that the statute seeks to “protect.”  
And it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on 
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other 
securities, to which § 10(b) applies.
159
 
In announcing the transactional test, Justice Scalia sought to justify his use 
of the term “listed” rather than “registered” by noting that the Exchange 
Act’s “registration requirements apply only to securities listed on national 
securities exchanges.”
160
 
The transactional test’s basis in the text of Section 10(b) has 
significant implications for plaintiffs seeking to assert f-squared claims.  
Specifically, if the “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges” 
prong of the test corresponds to the “purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange” provision of Section 10(b), 
then the “domestic transactions in other securities” prong of the test 
necessarily corresponds to the “any security not so registered” provision of 
the statute.  Consequently, Congress’s motivation for including the phrase 
“any security not so registered” in the text of Section 10(b) is directly 
relevant to how lower courts interpret the “domestic transactions in other 
securities” prong of the transactional test. 
The Exchange Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress included 
the phrase “any security not so registered” to provide for the regulation of 
the domestic over-the-counter markets, not foreign securities exchanges.
161
  
As originally drafted, the Act regulated only purchases and sales of 
registered securities.
162
  The phrase “any security not so registered” was 
subsequently added to prevent a large-scale exodus from the national 
 
text as on the presumption against extraterritoriality.”); see also George T. Conway, III, 
Postscript to Morrison v. National Australia Bank, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 14, 2010, at 5 
(acknowledging that the transactional test’s “reference to ‘the purchase or sale of a security 
listed on an American stock exchange’—derives from § 10(b)’s reference to ‘the purchase 
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange’”). 
 159. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 160. Id. at 2885. 
 161. See generally Randall W. Quinn, The Supreme Court’s Use of Legislative History in 
Interpreting the Federal Securities Laws, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 262, 276 (1994) (asserting that 
“[a]s to the securities laws specifically, legislative history provides an invaluable context for 
judicial interpretation”). 
 162. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 426–28, 443–44 (1990). 
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securities exchanges.
163
  Congress feared that if the Act’s scope was limited 
to registered securities, companies would de-list from the national 
exchanges in favor of selling their securities in the over-the-counter 
markets.
164
  The inclusion of the phrase “any security not so registered” was 
designed to remove this incentive by bringing the over-the-counter markets 
within the purview of the Exchange Act.
165
 
The statutory text confirms that regulation of the domestic over-the-
counter markets was a key objective of the Seventy-Third Congress.  The 
Exchange Act’s prologue acknowledges that “transactions in securities as 
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter 
markets are affected with a national public interest which makes it 
necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions.”
166
  
According to the Act, the need for regulation stemmed from the fact that 
(1) “[transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities 
exchanges and over-the-counter markets] . . . in large part originate outside 
the States in which the exchanges and over-the-counter markets are 
located[;]” (2) “[t]he prices established and offered in such transactions are 
generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and 
foreign countries[;]” and (3) “[f]requently the prices of securities on such 
exchanges and [over-the-counter] markets are susceptible to manipulation 
and control.”
167
 
The United States Supreme Court has likewise recognized that “[t]he 
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation 
of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges 
and in over-the-counter markets.”
168
 
Thus, for the purposes of the transactional test, the most logical 
reading of the phrase “domestic transactions in other securities” is 
“transactions in the domestic over-the-counter market.”
169
  This distinction 
 
 163. Id. at 443, 444 n.263. 
 164. Stock Exchange Practices:  Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 before 
the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. 6495-96, 6539-41, 6547-49, 6554-55, 
6699 (1934) [hereinafter Hearings], reprinted in 6 and 7 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 22 (J.S. Ellenberger 
& Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 
15–16 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 18; S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5–6 
(1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 17. 
 165. Hearings, supra note 164, Item 22; H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, supra note 164, Item 18, 
at 22–23.   
 166. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010).  According to Justice Scalia, “[n]othing suggests that this 
national public interest pertains to transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and 
markets.”  Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2882 (emphasis in original). 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010). 
 168. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). 
 169. See Vivendi, S.A.’s Supplemental Memorandum of Law Regarding the Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. at 5 n.2, In re Vivendi 
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is significant to the extent it excludes transactions conducted on exchange 
markets from the “domestic transactions in other securities” prong of the 
transactional test.  Whereas exchange markets are “auction markets where 
the orders of buyers and sellers are concentrated for the purpose of offering 
transactions through the meeting of the highest bid and the lowest offer,”
170
 
“the over-the-counter market is a negotiated market in which . . . dealers 
acting as principals buy from and sell to investors or other dealers at an 
undisclosed profit.”
171
  Consequently, U.S. investors’ purchase of securities 
on foreign exchanges would not qualify as “transactions in the domestic 
over-the-counter market” under the proposed reading of the transactional 
test. 
This text-based rationale arguably provides the simplest, most direct 
means for disposing of f-squared claims post-Morrison.  Had the Supreme 
Court simply affirmed the dismissal of the Australian Plaintiffs’ claims 
without bothering to articulate a new test for determining the scope of 
Section 10(b), lower courts would be justified in relying on the rationale 
underlying the Morrison Court’s holding.  In announcing the transactional 
test, however, the Supreme Court sought to limit lower courts’ analyses to 
whether the relevant transactions involved a security listed on a domestic 
stock exchange or traded in the domestic over-the-counter market.  To date, 
the construction advocated in this Article represents the only text-based 
rationale for dismissing f-squared claims under the transactional test. 
V.   IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEWLY-CLARIFIED TRANSACTIONAL TEST 
As demonstrated in Section IV, supra, securities transactions in the 
domestic over-the-counter market remain subject to the antifraud 
 
Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The phrase ‘purchase or 
sale of any other security in the United States’ . . . plainly refers only to purchases of 
unregistered securities . . . .”); The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC’s Supplemental 
Memorandum of Law Addressing the Impact of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
on its Pending Motions to Dismiss at 10 n.7, In re Royal Bank of Scot. Group PLC Sec. 
Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The [Morrison] Court’s statement that the 
Exchange Act applies to ‘domestic transactions in other securities’ besides those listed in 
the United States appears to refer to domestic transactions in unlisted securities (e.g., over-
the-counter securities that do not qualify for listing on a domestic exchange), as opposed to 
securities listed on foreign exchanges.”); see also Lancer Mgmt. Group LLC v. Lauer, No. 
05-60584, 2011 WL 573954, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2011) (finding Morrison 
distinguishable where the relevant entities “traded substantial securities on U.S. exchanges 
[and] over-the-counter markets”); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2010 WL 3377409, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that “‘domestic transactions’ or ‘purchases or sales in the 
United States’ means purchases and sales of securities explicitly solicited by the issuer 
within the United States rather than transactions in foreign-traded securities”). 
 170. Brief for Petitioners at 15 n.7, Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (No. 
150). 
 171. Id. at 15. 
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provisions of Section 10(b) under the Supreme Court’s new transactional 
test.  Post-Morrison, however, some lower courts have shown a willingness 
to dismiss securities fraud claims predicated on OTC transactions.
172
  Not 
surprisingly, the merits of these holdings appear dubious when analyzed in 
light of the newly-clarified transactional test. 
Consider, for example, the securities fraud class action lawsuit 
brought against Société Générale (“SocGen”)
173
 following the collapse of 
the subprime mortgage market.
174
  There, two of the three named plaintiffs 
(“Ordinary Share Plaintiffs”)
175
 were U.S. investors who purchased 
SocGen’s ordinary shares on the Euronext Paris stock exchange.
176
  The 
third named plaintiff (“ADR Plaintiff”)
177
 was a U.S. investor who 
purchased SocGen ADRs in the domestic over-the-counter market.
178
  
While conceding that the ADR Plaintiff’s claims remained viable post-
Morrison, the defendants moved to dismiss the Ordinary Share Plaintiffs’ 
claims on the ground they ran afoul of the transactional test.
179
  To the 
parties’ surprise, the judge dismissed all three of the named plaintiffs’ 
claims based solely on Morrison.
180
 
Significantly, in evaluating the ADR Plaintiff’s claims, the judge 
ignored the transactional test altogether.  Instead, dismissal was predicated 
on the court’s characterization of ADR trades as “predominantly foreign 
securities transaction[s].”
181
  For support, the court cited to a single, pre-
Morrison opinion applying the now defunct conduct and effects tests.
182
  
 
 172. Such holdings were foreseeable given the Supreme Court’s failure, in announcing 
the transactional test, to reference the over-the-counter market explicitly or otherwise 
specify the circumstances under which a transaction will be deemed to have occurred in the 
domestic over-the-counter market. 
 173. In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 WL 3910286, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010). 
 174. Id. 
 175. The Ordinary Share Plaintiffs were Vermont Pension Investment Committee and 
Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Fund.  Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. The ADR Plaintiff was United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 880 
Retail Food Employers Joint Pension Fund.  Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at *5–*6. 
 180. Id. at *5–*7. 
 181. Id. at *6. 
 182. Id. (citing Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp. 2d 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).  Copeland, in 
turn, cites to In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation for the proposition that 
“[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a predominately foreign securities transaction.”  
Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506 (citing In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 
F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).  However, the court in SCOR Holding did not rule that 
ADR trades are predominately foreign securities transactions but instead simply assumed so 
for the sake of applying the effects test.  SCOR Holding, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 561.  Moreover, 
in SCOR Holding the court ultimately determined that it possessed subject matter 
jurisdiction “over the claims of any person who purchased . . . ADSs on the NYSE.”  Id. at 
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Moreover, the judge incorrectly asserted that dismissal of the ADR 
Plaintiff’s claims was supported by Credit Suisse.
183
  In Credit Suisse, 
however, Judge Marrero’s dismissal order was limited to claims brought by 
investors who purchased Credit Suisse shares on the Swiss Stock 
Exchange, and the claims of investors who purchased ADRs on the New 
York Stock Exchange were allowed to proceed.
184
 
The authority relied upon by the judge, thus, did not support dismissal 
of the ADR Plaintiff’s claims.  Although the ruling is arguably ripe for 
reversal as a result, had the court undertaken a text-based analysis of the 
transactional test, the error of its reasoning would have been plain.  
Application of the transactional test would have revealed that the ADR 
Plaintiff’s claims necessarily survive post-Morrison for the simple reason 
that they are predicated on securities transactions in the domestic over-the-
counter market. 
Another opinion that is questionable in light of the newly-clarified 
transactional test is Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm.
185
  
In that case, a group of Cayman Island based hedge funds (“Funds”)
186
 
claimed to be the victims of a pump-and-dump scheme orchestrated by 
certain defendants, including the Funds’ Europe-based investment 
manager.
187
  According to the amended complaint, the scheme worked as 
follows:  After obtaining control of a dormant or near dormant shell 
company, the defendants would cause one or more of the Funds to purchase 
a subscription for the company’s shares.
188
  The defendants, meanwhile, 
would already own large quantities of the company’s shares or have the 
company issue shares and warrants to them in exchange for arranging the 
Funds’ purchases.
189
  Thereafter, the defendants would cause the Funds to 
trade and re-trade “the stocks many times over, sometimes on the same 
day, between and among [themselves]” in order to inflate the stocks’ price 
 
560 n.3. 
 183. Société Générale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *6 n.5. 
 184. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
The SocGen court rejected the Ordinary Share Plaintiffs’ argument that because they were 
U.S. investors who placed their buy orders through U.S.-based investment managers, their 
purchases constituted domestic transactions within the meaning of the transactional test.  
Société Générale, 2010 WL 3910286, at *5–*6.  However, like the cases discussed in 
Section III(B), supra, the SocGen judge did not base his decision on the text of the 
transactional test but instead relied on Judge Marrero’s holding in Credit Suisse and the 
Morrison Court’s damning indictment of the conduct and effects tests to conclude that 
dismissal of the Ordinary Share Plaintiffs’ claims was warranted.  See id. 
 185. No. 09 CV 8862, 2010 WL 5415885, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Amended Complaint at 11–12, Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Homm, 
2010 WL 5415885 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010) (No. 09 CV 8862). 
 189. Id. at 12. 
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“to the point at which [the] [d]efendants were free to sell previously 
untradeable shares and exercise certain warrants, which [the] [d]efendants 
then sold to the Funds at a profit.”
190
  These intra-Funds trades also served 
to generate commissions for certain of the defendants acting in a broker-
dealer capacity.
191
  The amended complaint asserted claims under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as well as common law claims for fraud and breach 
of fiduciary duty.
192
 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York dismissed the amended complaint based on Morrison.
193
  In relevant 
part, the order provided: 
Defendants, with the exception of [Todd] Ficeto and Hunter 
[World Markets, Inc.], are foreign nationals.  The corporations 
that issued the Penny Stocks were registered with the SEC, 
however, their shares were not traded on a domestic exchange.  
Instead, the fraudulent scheme alleged involved private offerings 
[registered with the SEC] . . . in which the Funds were caused to 
purchase the illiquid shares directly from the companies through 
private placements.  At no point were the shares released to the 
general market.  In fact, the entire “market” alleged was the 
trading by and between the Funds.
194
 
Consequently, the court found that dismissal was warranted because the 
Funds’ trades did not satisfy the transactional test.
195
 
In reaching its holding, however, the court appears to have been 
preoccupied with the manner in which the Funds initially acquired the 
securities such that it failed to consider the impact of the subsequent intra-
Funds trades used to inflate the securities’ prices.
196
  Moreover, the court’s 
application of the transactional test was limited to evaluating whether the 
trades constituted “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges” 
under the first prong of the test without considering whether the trades 
qualified as “domestic transactions in other securities” under the second 
prong of the test.
197
  As noted previously, two of the defendants, Todd 
 
 190. Absolute Activist, 2010 WL 5415885, at *3. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Amended Complaint, supra note 188, at 56–60. 
 193. Because oral argument on the defendants’ motion to dismiss was held one day 
before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Morrison, the parties were not given an 
opportunity, either orally or in writing, to address the transactional test’s impact on the 
Funds’ claims.  Absolute Activist, 2010 WL 5415885, at *4. 
 194. Id. at *5.  The various penny stock companies’ shares, however, were either quoted 
on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board or by Pink OTC Markets Inc.  Amended Complaint, 
supra note 188, at 2. 
 195. Absolute Activist, 2010 WL 5415885, at *5–*6. 
 196. The court’s analysis similarly fails to account for the eventual sale of the 
defendants’ personal holdings to the Funds. 
 197. Morrison III, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
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Ficeto and Hunter World Markets, Inc., were California residents.  
Significantly, Hunter was the registered broker-dealer responsible for 
executing the intra-Funds trades alleged in the amended complaint.
198
  
Ficeto, meanwhile, was Hunter’s president and a registered securities agent 
in several U.S. states.
199
  Thus, although the buy and sell orders for the 
intra-Funds trades may have originated in Europe, the actual trades 
arguably took place in the domestic over-the-counter market such that they 
satisfy Morrison under the newly-clarified transactional test.
200
  At the very 
least, the parties should have been given an opportunity to brief the impact 
of Morrison so that a better-developed factual record would exist regarding 
the precise nature of the intra-Funds trades.
201
 
CONCLUSION 
In announcing the transactional test, the Morrison Court sought to 
create a new, bright-line rule that would avoid the unpredictability and 
inconsistency of the conduct and effects tests.  In application, the 
transactional test has thrust a reasonably well-settled area of the law into 
abject confusion.  This outcome was inevitable in light of the Court’s 
inability to commit to a single articulation of the test and its concomitant 
failure to define the test’s precise scope and contours.  Nonetheless, this 
Article argues that by examining the statutory text from which the 
transactional test was derived, a bright-line rule may still be salvaged from 
Morrison. 
 
 
 198. Amended Complaint, supra note 188, at 6, 8, 11–13, 15–16, 22–23, 26, 31, 34, 38, 
41, 51. 
 199. Id. at 5, 8. 
 200. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 
166, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Société Générale Sec. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495, 2010 WL 
3910286, at *5–*6 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  The Funds subsequently raised this argument on 
appeal.  Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6–10, Absolute Activist Value Master Fund 
Ltd. v. Ficeto, No. 11-221 (2d Cir. July 21, 2011). 
 201. See Anwar v. Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding 
“that a more developed factual record is necessary to inform a proper determination as to 
whether [the] [p]laintiffs’ purchases . . . occurred in the United States”); see also Painter et 
al., supra note 116, at 7 (noting that although “the vast majority of over-the-counter 
transactions . . . occur in one country or another . . . situations occur where the location of 
the transaction is ambiguous”). 
